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NOTE
WILLIAMS V. GAYE: FURTHER BLURRING
THE LINES BETWEEN INSPIRATION
AND INFRINGEMENT
ALYSSA CHAVERS*
“It must be remembered that, while there are an enormous number of
possible permutations of the musical notes of the scale, only a few are
pleasing; and much fewer still suit the infantile demands of the popu-
lar ear. Recurrence is not therefore an inevitable badge of
plagiarism.”1
INTRODUCTION
During the summer of 2013, Robin Thicke’s (“Thicke”) and Pharrell
Williams’s (“Williams”) song “Blurred Lines” became wildly popular
and occupied music charts for weeks.2 The song was dubbed as Bill-
board’s Song of the Summer for 2013,3 and was the best-selling single of
2013;4 thus, it was no surprise when the controversies over “Blurred
* J.D. Candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law, May 2020; B.A. Sociology,
University of Colorado at Colorado Springs, May 2015. Executive Articles Editor, 2019–2020,
Golden Gate University Law Review. The author would like to express her deepest gratitude to the
entire Golden Gate University Law Review staff for their contributions in the writing and editing of
this Note. The author would especially like to thank her husband, Jacob M. Chavers, for his
unwavering support during the entire process.
1 Darrell v. Joe Morris Music Co., 113 F.2d 80, 80 (2d Cir. 1940) (per curiam).
2 Liat Kornowski, 15 Notable Events of Summer 2013, HUFF. POST (Sept. 2, 2013, 8:46 AM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/02/notable-events-of-summer-2013_n_3836247.html.
3 Gary Trust, Robin Thicke’s ‘Blurred Lines’ Is Billboard’s Song of the Summer, BILLBOARD
(Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.billboard.com/articles/news/5687036/robin-thickes-blurred-lines-is-bill
boards-song-of-the-summer.
4 Stuart Dredge, Global Music Sales Fell in 2013 Despite Strong Growth for Streaming Ser-
vices, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/
mar/18/music-sales-ifpi-2013-spotify-streaming (reporting that “Blurred Lines” sold 14.8 million
units in track downloads and equivalent streams).
3
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Lines” made headlines.5 The song was highly controversial. It included
misogynistic lyrics,6 and a music video that was removed, and then cen-
sored on YouTube for violating the site’s policies regarding nudity.7
During an interview, Thicke discussed the overwhelming popularity of
the song stating, “We felt like maybe it was something special but it was
so different. We didn’t know it would be this big.”8 While “Blurred
Lines” enjoyed chart-topping popularity, a separate controversy was de-
veloping. Marvin Gaye’s (“Gaye”) family accused Thicke and Williams
of copying the “feel and sound” of Gaye’s song “Got to Give It Up.”9
Thicke had previously, and publicly, indicated that “Got to Give It Up”
was the influence for “Blurred Lines.”10
The case began in the United States District Court in the Central
District of California (“district court”), with a jury finding in favor of
Nona Marvisa Gaye, Frankie Christian Gaye, and Marvin Gaye III
(“Gaye Parties”).11 The Thicke Parties (Pharrell Williams, Robin Thicke,
Clifford Harris, Jr., and More Water from Nazareth Publishing, Inc.) ap-
pealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
(“Ninth Circuit”), where the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
ruling, holding that “Blurred Lines infringed on the copyright in “Got to
Give It Up.”12 The decision set the music world into a flurry–artists
5 Dorian Lynskey, Blurred Lines: The Most Controversial Song of the Decade, THE GUARD-
IAN (Nov. 13, 2013, 2:32 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/music/2013/nov/13/blurred-lines-most-
controversial-song-decade.
6 Geeta Dayal, Robin Thicke’s “Blurred Lines”: It’s sexist and awful., SLATE (Dec. 19, 2013,
2:44 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/the_music_club/features/2013/music_club_2013/robin_
thicke_s_blurred_lines_it_s_sexist_and_awful.html (quoting lyrics, such as “I know you want it”
and “I hate these blurred lines”).
7 Jessica Rawden, Robin Thicke’s Blurred Lines Video Banned from YouTube, CINEMA
BLEND, https://www.cinemablend.com/pop/Robin-Thicke-Blurred-Lines-Video-Banned-From-You-
Tube-54244.html.
8 Radio.com, GRAMMY Behind The Song: Robin Thicke’s “Blurred Lines,” YOUTUBE (Dec.
10, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=63&v=pHP_yOGs-HQ.
9 Zoe Chace, Robin Thicke’s Song Sounds Like Marvin Gaye. So He’s Suing Gaye’s Family,
NPR (Aug. 19, 2013, 1:05 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2013/08/19/213471083/robin-
thickes-song-sounds-like-marvin-gaye-so-thicke-is-suing-gayes-family.
10 Jon Caramanica, Yesterday’s Style, Today’s Hits, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 2, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/03/arts/music/blurred-lines-makes-robin-thicke-white-souls-lead
er.html.
11 Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., Case No. LA CV13–06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 WL
4479500, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d
1106 (9th Cir. 2018).
12 Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1138 (9th Cir. 2018) (the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part
and reversed in part. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling regarding copyright in-
fringement, but reversed the judgment against Harris and the Interscope Parties).
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feared that the decision would limit their creativity and put a stop to any
music that has the same feel or groove as other music.13
The first opinion was published on March 21, 2018 and applied the
inverse-ratio rule as the standard for the court’s analysis.14 The inverse-
ratio rule operates like a “sliding scale”—the greater the showing of ac-
cess to a song, the lesser the showing of substantial similarity is re-
quired.15 The rule is binding precedent in the Ninth Circuit, and as the
opinion states, the court was “bound to apply it.”16 However, about four
months later, on July 11, 2018, the court unexpectedly published a modi-
fied opinion to the Williams v. Gaye case.17 The two opinions look virtu-
ally identical, with one glaring omission—all discussion of the inverse-
ratio rule is gone.18
If the court was bound by precedent to apply the inverse-ratio rule to
this particular case, then it is reasonable to question why the rule was
omitted entirely in the subsequent, and therefore binding opinion.19 The
inverse-ratio rule is heavily criticized20 and the second, modified opinion
may have been the Ninth Circuit’s way of adapting to the changing land-
scape in the copyright realm. This Note argues, in part, that the omission
of the inverse-ratio rule in the second Williams opinion is proof of the
Ninth Circuit quietly abolishing the outdated rule.
Additionally, this Note demonstrates that the Ninth Circuit’s deci-
sion to abandon the rule indicates their understanding that copyright law
must better reflect today’s technology. As with many areas of law, copy-
right law has been due for an update, so that the law may better reflect
today’s technology and refrain from stifling creativity in the music indus-
try. For the music industry to continue to expand and thrive, adaptation
13 Adrienne Gibbs, Marvin Gaye’s Family Wins ‘Blurred Lines’ Appeal; Pharrell, Robin
Thicke Must Pay, FORBES (Mar. 21, 2018, 3:37 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adriennegibbs/
2018/03/21/marvin-gaye-wins-blurred-lines-lawsuit-pharrell-robin-thicke-t-i-off-hook/#a8b7104689
b4; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Musicologists in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appel-
lees, 2016 WL 4592128, Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018) (over 200 songwriters,
composers, musicians, and producers warned the Ninth Circuit about the effect on the music industry
if infringement was found against the Thicke parties).
14 Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d at 1163 (9th Cir.), amended by 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018).
18 Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018).
19 Compare Gaye, 885 F.3d at 1163 n.6 (explaining that the inverse-ratio rule is “binding
precedent under [their] circuit law, and [they] are bound to apply it.”) with, Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106
(9th Cir. 2018).
20 David Aronoff, Exploding the “Inverse Ratio Rule”, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 125,
143 (2008) (“The IRR is a deleterious doctrine that provides no analytical benefits in evaluating or
determining a copyright infringement case.”); see also William F. Patry, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT
§ 9:91 (2019) (“There is nothing positive that can be said about a rule that lacks any clarity at all:
trying to get a jury to both understand the rule and apply it properly is totally impossible.”).
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of past musical works through sampling and borrowing is necessary.21
As Judge Learned Hand noted, there are only a limited number of musi-
cal note combinations that are pleasing to the listener, making the possi-
ble combination of notes for new musical works highly limited.22 Instead
of viewing the adaptation of past musical works as “copying,” copyright
law must support the notion that artists’ work can be used as building
blocks for future creators to produce their own music, especially consid-
ering the amount of music available to the public today.23
Part I of this Note outlines the factual and procedural history of Wil-
liams and discusses the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in its first and second
opinions. Part II discusses the historical background of copyright law in
the United States, namely the Copyright Act of 1909 and the Copyright
Act of 1976. Additionally, this section explains the structure of a music
copyright infringement suit, including the elements required to make a
successful infringement claim.
Part III argues why courts should presume access in music copyright
infringement cases, and subsequently, abandon the inverse-ratio rule.
The inverse-ratio rule should be abandoned because people’s access to
music has never been easier in today’s digital world. A plaintiff’s burden
to prove substantial similarity between the plaintiff’s song and the defen-
dant’s song, should not be diminished as a result of the defendant’s ac-
cess to the plaintiff’s song. Instead, a defendant’s access to a particular
song should be presumed in copyright infringement cases. This Note
does not argue that the access requirement is unnecessary in such cases.
Access is still necessary for copying because one cannot copy what one
has never seen. However, it does not necessarily follow that more access
increases the likelihood of copying.
I. WILLIAMS V. GAYE – FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1976, Marvin Gaye recorded “Got To Give It Up.”24 In 1977,
“Got To Give It Up” reached number one on Billboard’s Hot 100 chart,
and in the same year Jobete Music Company registered the song with the
United States Copyright Office.25 The registration included six pages of
handwritten sheet music accrediting the words and music of “Got to Give
21 Carys J. Craig & Guillaume Laroche, Out of Tune: Why Copyright Law Needs Music Les-
sons, in OSGOODE LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 43, 48 (B.C. Doagoo et al. eds., 2014).
22 Darrell, 113 F.2d at 80.
23 Alison P. Wynn, Note, Copyright Law—Unique Characteristics of Music Warrant Its Own
System: How Adopting the Intended Audience Test Can Save Music Copyright Litigation, 39 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2017).
24 Gaye, 895 F.3d at 1116.
25 Id.
4
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It Up” to Marvin Gaye.26 Upon Marvin Gaye’s death, the Gaye Parties
inherited the copyrights to Marvin Gaye’s musical composition.27
Thirty-six years later in 2012, Williams and Thicke wrote and re-
corded “Blurred Lines.”28 Clifford Harris, Jr.29 (“Harris”) separately
wrote and recorded a verse for “Blurred Lines” that was added to the
song several months later.30 By 2013, “Blurred Lines” was the best-sell-
ing single in the United States.31 The copyright to the musical composi-
tion of “Blurred Lines” is jointly held by Thicke, Williams, and
Harris.”32
A. THE GAYE PARTIES PREVAIL IN THE DISTRICT COURT
The Gaye Parties approached Williams and Thicke with infringe-
ment accusations after hearing “Blurred Lines.”33 When negotiations
failed, Williams, Thicke, and Harris filed suit in the district court on
August 15, 2013, seeking declaratory judgment of non-infringement.34
The Gaye Parties counterclaimed against the Thicke Parties, claiming
copyright infringement in “Got to Give It Up.”35
Experts play a crucial role in helping parties establish the element of
copying.36 Both parties relied on expert testimony in this case: Sandy
Wilbur testified on behalf of the Thicke Parties to show there were no
similarity between the two songs; Dr. Ingrid Monson and Judith Finell
testified on behalf of the Gaye Parties to show the songs were substan-
tially similar.37 The experts’ opinions differed greatly. Wilbur testified
that there was no evidence of substantial similarity between “Blurred
Lines” and “Got To Give It Up,”38 while Dr. Monson identified har-
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Clifford Harris, Jr. is popularly known as T.I., Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1116 (9th
Cir. 2018).
30 Gaye, 895 F.3d at 1116.
31 Keith Caulfield, Justin Timberlake’s ‘20/20’ 2013’s Best Selling Album, ‘Blurred Lines’
Top Song, BILLBOARD (Jan. 2, 2014), https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/5855151/justin-
timberlakes-2020-2013s-best-selling-album-blurred-lines-top-song (explaining that 6.5 million cop-
ies of “Blurred Lines” were sold in 2013).
32 Gaye, 895 F.3d at 1116.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Michael Der Manuelian, Note, The Role of the Expert Witness in Music Copyright Infringe-
ment Cases, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 127, 129 (1988), available at https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=2804&context=flr.
37 Gaye, 895 F.3d at 1117.
38 Id.
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monic and melodic similarities between the two songs.39 Finnell identi-
fied a “‘constellation’ of eight similarities” between the two songs,
“consisting of the signature phrase, hooks, hooks with backup vocals,
“Theme X,” backup hooks, bass melodies, keyboard parts, and unusual
percussion choices.”40
Both Williams and Thicke testified that they had access to “Got to
Give It Up” and that they drew inspiration from Marvin Gaye.41 After
two days of deliberations, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Gaye
Parties, finding the Thicke Parties liable for infringing the copyright in
“Got To Give It Up.” The jury awarded the Gaye Parties four million
dollars in damages.42 Both the Thicke Parties and the Gaye Parties ap-
pealed to the Ninth Circuit.43
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT AFFIRMED THE DISTRICT COURT RULING
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court ruling in a published
opinion on March 21, 2018 (“the first opinion”).44 On July 11, 2018, the
court issued a modified opinion to the Williams case (“the second opin-
ion”). The opinions are virtually identical, with the exception of the dis-
cussion regarding the inverse-ratio rule in the second opinion.
1. The Discussion and Analysis of the Inverse-Ratio Rule in the First
Opinion
In the first opinion’s discussion of the applicable standard in a copy-
right infringement claim, the court explains that they are bound to apply
the inverse-ratio rule.45 The inverse-ratio rule “operates like a sliding
scale: The greater the showing of access, the lesser the showing of sub-
stantial similarity is required.”46 The court explained that because Wil-
liams and Thicke admitted to a “high degree” of access to “Got to Give It
Up,” the Gaye Parties’ burden of proving substantial similarity was
lowered.47
39 Id. at 1118.
40 Id. at 1117.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1118.
43 Id. at 1115–16 (Three consolidated appeals were made to the Ninth Circuit following the
district court’s judgment: the Thicke parties appeal, the Interscope Parties appeal, and the Gaye
family appeal. For purposes of this Note, only the Thicke parties appeal will be discussed as the
Interscope Parties appeal and the Gaye family appeal are not relevant to the discussion of this Note).
44 Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir.), amended by 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018).
45 Id. at 1163 n.6.
46 Id. at 1163 (9th Cir.).
47 Id.
6
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This application of the inverse-ratio rule was also shown in a discus-
sion of one of the instructions48 to the jury in the district court.49 Instruc-
tion 41 stated: “If you conclude that the Thicke Parties had access to
either or both of the Gaye Parties’ works before creating . . . their works,
you may consider that access in connection with determining whether
there is substantial similarity between . . . [the] works.”50 The court goes
on to explain that the instruction was “[i]n line with our inverse ratio
rule” and the instruction allows the jury to “consider access ‘in connec-
tion with’ substantial similarity.”51
2. The Omission of the Inverse-Ratio Rule in the Second Opinion
and the Remaining Analyses
On appeal, the Thicke Parties asked the Ninth Circuit to reverse the
district court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment and vacate
the district court’s judgment and remand for a new trial.52
The Thicke Parties requested reversal of their motion for summary
judgment because they argued the district court erred in its application of
the extrinsic test for substantial similarity.53 The Ninth Circuit allowed
the district court’s decision to stand, and held that the order was not
reviewable because the court “generally do[es] ‘not review a denial of a
summary judgment motion after a full trial on the merits.’”54
Next, the Thicke Parties request to vacate the district court’s judg-
ment and remand for a new trial was also denied.55 There were several
arguments the Thicke Parties gave for the remand of a new trial: “in-
structional error56, improper admission of expert testimony, and lack of
evidence supporting the verdict.”57 The Thicke Parties argued that the
verdict was “against the clear weight of the evidence” because “there is
48 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining general instruction as instructions
given to the jury by the judge before they begin deliberation).
49 Gaye, 885 F.3d at 1168 n.12.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Gaye, 895 F.3d at 1115.
53 Id. at 1122.
54 Id. at 1122 (quoting Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236, 1243 (9th Cir.
2014) (quoting Banuelos v. Constr. Laborers’ Tr. Funds for S. Cal., 382 F.3d 897, 902 (9th Cir.
2004)).
55 Id. at 1128.
56 Id. at 1115 (The Thicke Parties argued that Instructions 42 and 43 were given incorrectly,
and the Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not err in giving either instruction. For purposes
of this Note, further analysis on the instructional error argument is not relevant to the analysis of this
Note).
57 Id.
7
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no extrinsic or intrinsic similarity between the two songs.”58 The court
explained that they were bound by the “limited nature of [their] appellate
function in reviewing the district court’s denial of a motion for a new
trial.”59
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that
the Thicke Parties infringed on the Gaye’s copyright in “Got To Give It
Up.”60 The court explained that so long as “there was some ‘reasonable
basis’ for the jury’s verdict,” [they would] not reverse the district court’s
denial of a motion for a new trial.”61 The court will typically reverse
“only when there is an absolute absence of evidence to support the jury’s
verdict.”62 For music copyright cases, courts “will not second-guess the
jury’s application of the intrinsic test.”63 The court also explained that
their “decision does not grant license to copyright a musical style or
‘groove.’”64 The Ninth Circuit held that there was no abuse in the district
court’s discretion in denying the Thicke Parties’ motion for a new trial.65
Similar to the first opinion, the court explained that, without direct
evidence of copying, proof of infringement involves fact-based showings
that the defendant had access to the plaintiff’s work and the two works
are substantially similar.66 However, where the first opinion discussed
the inverse-ratio rule immediately following that rule,67 the second opin-
ion omitted the discussion entirely.68 Additionally, where the first opin-
ion’s discussion of the inverse-ratio rule is used as a justification for the
language in Instruction 41,69 the second opinion omits discussion of the
inverse-ratio rule.70 In its place, and directly after quoting the language
from Instruction 41, the court writes, “Instruction 41 merely reiterates
that the Gayes may choose to prove infringement by using a circumstan-
tial theory.”71
58 Id. at 1127.
59 Id. (quoting Hung Lam v. City of San Jose, 869 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th Cir. 2017)) (quoting
Kode v. Carlson, 596 F.3d 608, 612 (9th Cir. 2010)).
60 Id. at 1138 (explaining that the district court’s entry of judgement against Harris and the
Interscope parties was reversed, but the rest of the district court’s judgment was affirmed).
61 Id. at 1127 (quoting Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007)).
62 Id. (quoting Hung Lam v. City of San Jose, 869 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th Cir. 2017)) (quoting
Kode, 596 F.3d at 612 (9th Cir. 2010)).
63 Id. (quoting Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000)).
64 Id. at 1138.
65 Id. at 1128.
66 Id. at 1119.
67 Gaye, 885 F.3d at 1163, amended by 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018).
68 Gaye, 895 F.3d at 1119.
69 Gaye, 885 F.3d at 1168 n.12, amended by 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018).
70 Gaye, 895 F.3d at 1123 n.11.
71 Id.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES
A. COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1909
Copyright laws in the United States come from a 1710 English stat-
ute known as the Statute of Anne.72 Most of the states created copyright
laws that emulated some form of this statute.73 Article I, Section 8 of the
United States Constitution grants Congress the power “to promote the
progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited times to au-
thors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries.”74 The primary purpose of copyright legislation is to en-
courage the creation and distribution of intellectual works for public wel-
fare.75 Another important purpose of copyright legislation is to give
creators credit for their contribution to society.76
Federal copyright statutes have undergone several revisions over the
last 200 years. “The first federal copyright statute was enacted in 1790
and covered maps, charts and books.”77 This statute gave authors and
proprietors protection for 14 years with the option of renewing for a sec-
ond term of 14 years.78 General revisions were made in 1831, 1856, and
1897 to reflect concerns among musical artists.79 In 1831, Congress
amended the Copyright Act to include musical compositions in the form
of sheet music.80 In 1856, an amendment granted individual copyright
holders of dramatic compositions the sole right to publicly perform the
piece.81 In 1897, Congress extended the Copyright Act to apply to any-
one publicly performing a protected musical work.82
The Copyright Act of 1909 was based on the printing press as the
main disseminator of information.83 The Act of 1909 protected “‘writ-
72 MARYBETH PETERS, COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF CONG., GENERAL GUIDE TO THE COP-
YRIGHT ACT OF 1976, ch. 1, 1:1 (1977), available at https://www.copyright.gov/reports/guide-to-
copyright.pdf.
73 Id.
74 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, § 4, 1 Stat. 436 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006)),
available at https://www.copyright.gov/history/Copyright_Enactments_1783-1973.pdf.
81 Benjamin W. Rudd, Notable Dates in American Copyright 1783–1969, 28 Q. J. Libr.
Cong. 137, 139 (1971), available at https://copyright.gov/history/dates.pdf.
82 Lydia Pallas Loren, The Evolving Role of “For Profit” Use in Copyright Law: Lessons
from the 1909 Act, 26 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 255, 260–61 (2010).
83 Id.
9
Chavers: Williams v. Gaye
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2020
12 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
ings’ of an author;” a writing was interpreted as a “fixation in a tangible
form [that had] a certain minimum amount of original, creative author-
ship.”84 Fourteen classes of works were enumerated in the Act: books,
periodicals, lectures, dramatic musical compositions, musical composi-
tions, maps, works of art, reproductions of a work of art, drawings of
plastic works of a scientific or technical character, photographs, prints
and pictorial illustrations, motion picture photoplays, motion pictures
other than photoplays, and sound recordings.85 Musical works only re-
ceived copyright protection if the work was published with a notice of
copyright.86 If the work was not published, the artist had to deposit the
composition with the Copyright Office for protection.87
Modernly, significant changes in technology, such as the radio, tele-
vision, communications satellites, cable television, computers, photo-
copying machines, and videotape recorders, made Congress’s revision of
the Copyright Act of 1909 crucial,88 and led to the Copyright Act of
1976.
B. COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976
The Copyright Act of 1976 brought about the most significant
change to the Copyright Act. It superseded the 1909 Act and granted the
public expanded rights.89 The 1976 Act protects “original works of au-
thorship which are fixed in a copy (material object, other than a pho-
norecord, from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device) or a phonorecord.”90 The 1976 Act enumerated seven classes of
works: literary works, musical works (including any accompanying
words), dramatic works, pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial,
84 MARYBETH PETERS, COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF CONG., GENERAL GUIDE TO THE COP-
YRIGHT ACT OF 1976, app. 2, A2:01 (1977) (citing Section 4 of the Copyright Act of 1909), availa-
ble at https://www.copyright.gov/reports/guide-to-copyright.pdf.
85 Id. (citing Section 5 of the Copyright Act of 1909).
86 Martin Bresslera & Robert L. Seigel, Retroactive Protection of Visual Arts Published With-
out a Copyright Notice: A Proposal, 7 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 115, 121–22 (1988).
87 Bridgeport Music, 2014 WL 7877773, at *8.
88 MARYBETH PETERS, COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF CONG., GENERAL GUIDE TO THE COP-
YRIGHT ACT OF 1976, ch. 1, 1:1 (1977), available at https://www.copyright.gov/reports/guide-to-
copyright.pdf.
89 MARYBETH PETERS, COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF CONG., Introduction to GENERAL
GUIDE TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976, (1977), available at https://www.copyright.gov/reports/
guide-to-copyright.pdf.
90 MARYBETH PETERS, COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF CONG., GENERAL GUIDE TO THE COP-
YRIGHT ACT OF 1976, app. 2, A2:01 (1977) (quoting Sections 102(a), 301, 101 of the Copyright Act
of 1976), available at https://www.copyright.gov/reports/guide-to-copyright.pdf.
10
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graphic, and sculptural works, motion pictures and other audiovisual
works, and finally, sound recordings.91
An important difference between the Copyright Act of 1909 and the
Act of 1976, is that only original compositions were protected under the
Act of 1909, but sound recordings were not.92 The goal of the 1976 Act
was to “strike a balance between protecting original works and stifling
further creativity.”93
C. STRUCTURE OF A MUSIC COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT SUIT
A copyright infringement claim involves many steps. To establish a
claim for copyright infringement, the plaintiff must show (1) that they
have a valid copyright ownership of an original musical work and (2)
that the defendant copied protected elements of the plaintiff’s work.94
1. Valid Copyright Ownership
A valid copyright certificate issued to the plaintiff from the Copy-
right Office is considered prima facie evidence95 that the plaintiff’s own-
ership is valid.96 If a defendant can show that the plaintiff’s work is not
sufficiently original, the defendant may rebut a presumption of validity.97
Defendants are only required to show that certain parts of the plaintiff’s
work are unoriginal—the parts that the plaintiff claims the defendant is
infringing upon.98 Defendants should hire an expert musicologist to show
that plaintiff’s work is not original.99 The expert must be able to show
that the plaintiff’s work is not original because it shares elements with
prior, protected works.100 These prior works are not subject to copyright
protection because they are in the public domain.101
91 Id.
92 Gaye, 895 F.3d at 1121.
93 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 401 F.3d 647, 656 (6th Cir. 2004) amended by
Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
94 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
95 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining prima facie evidence as evidence that
will establish a fact or sustain a judgment unless contradictory evidence is produced).
96 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2019).
97 Christine Lepera & Michael Manuelian, Music Plagiarism: A Framework for Litigation, 15
ENT. SPORT. L. 3, 3 (1997).
98 Id.
99 Michael Der Manuelian, Note, The Role of the Expert Witness in Music Copyright Infringe-
ment Cases, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 127, 129 (1988), available at https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=2804&context=flr.
100 Christine Lepera & Michael Manuelian, Music Plagiarism: A Framework for Litigation,
15 ENT. SPORT. L. 3, 4 (1997).
101 Id.
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Both the courts and the Copyright Act are silent as to any definition
of originality in copyright infringement cases. Typically, musical works
will satisfy the originality requirement since they generally contain
“some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, humble or obvious’ it might
be.”102
2. Defendant Copied Protected Elements of Plaintiff’s Work
If the plaintiff is able to prove that their copyright ownership of an
original work is valid, then the plaintiff must show that the defendant
copied protected elements of the plaintiff’s work, either directly or indi-
rectly.103 Typically, there is no direct evidence that the defendant has
copied the plaintiff’s work,104 so circumstantial evidence may be used. A
plaintiff who relies on circumstantial evidence is still required to show
that (1) the defendant had access to the plaintiff’s work, and (2) the two
works are “substantially similar.”105 Substantial similarity is satisfied by
a dual extrinsic and intrinsic test.106
i. Plaintiff Must Prove Defendant Had Access to Their Work
To prove that the defendant had access to the plaintiff’s work, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to
view or copy the work.107 Plaintiffs do not have to show that the defen-
dant actually heard the musical work, only that they had a reasonable
opportunity to hear it.108 Plaintiffs may use three theories to prove the
defendant had a reasonable opportunity to access or hear their work: the
chain of events theory, a combination of proof of wide dissemination and
subconscious copying,109 or by showing a striking similarity between the
works.110
102 Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 345 (1991) (quoting Melville B. Nimmer & David Nim-
mer, Nimmer on Copyright §§ 2.01 [A], [B] (1990)).
103 Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that
when direct evidence of copying is not available, the plaintiff may still prove that infringement
occurred, indirectly, by showing defendant had access and the two works are substantially similar).
104 Daniel E. Wanat, Copyright Law: Infringement of Musical Works and the Appropriateness
of Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(C), 39 U. MEM. L. REV.
1037, 1040 (2009).
105 Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1218–19 (9th Cir. 1996), superseded by statute as stated
in Griffin v. Peele, Case No. EDCV 17-01153 JGB (KKx), WL 5117555, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 2018).
106 Id. at 1218.
107 Three Boys Music, 212 F.3d at 482 (referencing Sid and Marty Krofft Television Produc-
tions, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 1977)).
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 485.
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Under the chain of events theory, the plaintiff must show that some-
one gave protected musical work to another person, and the work was
then passed on through various people before arriving with defendant.111
Under the second theory, the plaintiff proves access by showing that their
musical work was “widely distributed through extensive radio or televi-
sion airplay . . . record sales . . . [or] via the Internet . . . making practi-
cally any piece of music available (legally or illegally) with a mouse
click.”112 Under the third theory, the plaintiff can show a striking similar-
ity between the musical works.113 Plaintiff must show that “the similarity
is of a type which will preclude any explanation other than that of
copying.”114
ii. Plaintiff Must Prove There Is A Substantial Similarity Between the
Works
When the plaintiff proves that the defendant had access to their mu-
sical work, some courts will apply the “inverse ratio” rule.115 The in-
verse-ratio rule states that the more evidence the plaintiff provides in
showing the defendant’s access, the less evidence of substantial similar-
ity is needed, and vice versa.116
After access is established, the plaintiff must prove that their work
and the defendant’s work are substantially similar.117 The Ninth Circuit
uses a two-part test: “an objective extrinsic test and a subjective intrinsic
test.”118 For the extrinsic test, the court “analytically dissect[s]” the mu-
sical works by considering expert testimony.119 This dissection requires
“breaking the works ‘down into their constituent elements, and compar-
ing those elements for proof of copying as measured by substantial simi-
larity.’”120 If the plaintiff cannot provide sufficient evidence that a jury
111 See Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1067 (2d Cir. 1988) (explaining that “[a]ccess
through third parties connected to both a plaintiff and a defendant may be sufficient to prove a
defendant’s access to a plaintiff’s work” even though it is an “attenuated chain of events.”).
112 Margit Livingston & Joseph Urbinato, Copyright Infringement of Music: Determining
Whether What Sounds Alike is Alike, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 227, 265–66 (2013).
113 Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[I]n the absence
of any proof of access, a copyright plaintiff can still make out a case of infringement by showing that
the songs were “strikingly similar.”” See Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1220 (9th Cir. 1996)).
114 Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 905 (7th Cir. 1984).
115 Bridgeport Music, 2014 WL 7877773, at *11.
116 Id. at *11.
117 Id. at *5.
118 Id. at *6.
119 Id.
120 Id.
13
Chavers: Williams v. Gaye
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2020
16 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
could reasonably find extrinsic similarity, then a court must grant sum-
mary judgment for the defendant.121
Once the plaintiff has satisfied the extrinsic test, the court employs
the intrinsic test.122 The intrinsic test asks whether an “ordinary, reasona-
ble person would find the total concept and feel of the works to be sub-
stantially similar.”123 The jury must determine, based on the evidence
and testimony before them, whether there is a substantial similarity be-
tween the songs in question.124
III. ARGUMENT
A. MUSIC STREAMING SERVICES ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY
UBIQUITOUS
Music streaming services are becoming increasingly ubiquitous,
making the consumer’s access to music easier than ever. Even though the
type of technology changed over time, the general concern by copyright
holders has not: In the 1940s, the copyright concern was primarily con-
nected to technology such as movies and radio;125 In the 1970s, the con-
cern stemmed from computer software and photocopying;126 In the late
1990s and early 2000s, copyright holders were faced with a new concern
spurred on by the development of the MP3 and custom CD compila-
tion.127 The MP3 enabled music compression for faster downloading on
the Internet.128 Shortly after its development, several companies started
selling music over the Internet, allowing consumers to create custom
CDs.129 This technology was a big concern for record companies because
they believed that the MP3 allowed music to be easily copied, en-
121 Id. (referencing Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003)), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018).
122 Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 WL
4479500, at *21 (C.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d
1106 (9th Cir. 2018).
123 Bridgeport Music, 2015 WL 4479500, at *21 (quoting Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton,
212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000)).
124 Bridgeport Music, 2014 WL 7877773, at *6.
125 Mary L. Mills, Note, New Technology and the Limitations of Copyright Law: An Argu-
ment for Finding Alternatives to Copyright Legislation in an Era of Rapid Technological Change,
65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 307, 307 (1989), available at https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cgi/viewcon
tent.cgi?article=2766&context=cklawreview.
126 Id. at 314.
127 Karen Bevill, Note, Copyright Infringement and Access: Has the Access Requirement Lost
its Probative Value?, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 311, 327–28 (1999).
128 Id. at 328.
129 Id. at 327.
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couraged piracy, and could impede their economic growth.130 Scholars
and the music industry alike could not have foreseen the technological
advancements of today.131 The days of burning CDs are gone, and the
age of apps, custom playlists, and music streaming platforms are here.
The consumer’s ability to access music has never been easier.
Music streaming services have revolutionized the music industry by
changing the way artists make music and the way people access mu-
sic.132 Platforms like YouTube, Spotify, Apple Music, Pandora, Napster,
and SoundCloud allow anyone with Internet access to browse through
each platform’s library of music.
The most popular of these streaming services, Spotify and Apple
Music,133 provide its users with the largest catalogues of music available
on any of the services. Spotify quickly gained popularity after its found-
ing in 2006 as a small start-up in Sweden.134 Today, Spotify has a library
of 30-million-plus songs and adds roughly 20,000 new songs each
day.135 The entire library of music is accessible by 108 million paying
subscribers worldwide.136 Apple Music, Spotify’s main competitor,
launched in 2015 with on-demand music, programmed playlists, and a
live radio station.137 Today, Apple Music has a library of around 45 mil-
lion songs,138 with roughly 60 million people paying for a subscrip-
130 The Big Five Hit the Web, THE ECONOMIST (May 1999), available at https://www.econo
mist.com/business/1999/05/06/the-big-five-hit-the-web.
131 Karen Bevill, Note, Copyright Infringement and Access: Has the Access Requirement Lost
its Probative Value?, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 311 (1999) (discussing the MP3 and the Internet in
general as the biggest concern for copyright holders. This article was published in the early years of
the Internet, as the World Wide Web was only eight years old).
132 What is Streaming Music and How Has it Changed the Industry?, MN2S (Apr. 23, 2018),
https://mn2s.com/news/label-services/what-is-streaming-music-changed-industry/.
133 Most Popular Music Streaming Services in the United States as of March 2018, by
Monthly Users (in millions), STATISTA (Mar. 2018), https://www.statista.com/statistics/798125/most-
popular-us-music-streaming-services-ranked-by-audience/, (last visited Sept. 23, 2019).
134 Jeff Parsons, History of Spotify: How the Swedish Streaming Company Changed the Music
Industry, MIRROR (Apr. 3, 2018, 7:24 AM), https://www.mirror.co.uk/tech/history-spotify-how-
swedish-streaming-12291542.
135 Josh Levenson & Parker Hall, Apple Music v. Spotify, DIGITAL TRENDS (Sept. 6, 2019,
2:45 PM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/music/apple-music-vs-spotify/, (last visited Sept. 23,
2019).
136 Number of Spotify Premium Subscribers Worldwide from 1st Quarter 2015 to 2nd Quarter
2019 (in millions), STATISTA (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/244995/number-of-
paying-spotify-subscribers/, (last visited Sept. 23, 2019).
137 Stuart Dredge, Apple Music Launches to Take on Spotify – and Traditional Radio, THE
GUARDIAN (June 30, 2015, 11:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/30/apple-
music-launch-spotify-radio.
138 Josh Levenson & Parker Hall, Apple Music vs. Spotify: Which Service is the Streaming
King?, DIGITAL TRENDS (Sept. 6, 2019, 2:45 PM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/music/apple-
music-vs-spotify/, (last visited Sept. 23, 2019).
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tion.139 The large amount of users with access to these libraries of music
does not include the number of users who choose not to pay for an ac-
count with either of the services; that number is likely in the millions, as
well.140 Even in the age of music streaming services, radio still reigns as
the leading music platform with more than 243 million American adults
that listen each month.141
B. THE ACCESS REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE PRESUMED IN EVERY
MUSIC COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CASE
The access requirement should be presumed in music copyright in-
fringement cases because the requirement no longer fulfills its original
purpose due to the widespread availability of music today. An original
purpose of the access requirement in copyright infringement cases was to
protect a defendant from punishment for accidentally infringing upon a
plaintiff’s copyrighted work.142 The access requirement was intended as
an available defense.143 To prove access, a plaintiff may show that the
work was widely disseminated or a particular chain of events occurred in
which the defendant could have gained access to the copyrighted
work.144 A plaintiff is not required to prove that a defendant actually
heard or saw the work, only that the defendant had the opportunity to
hear it.145 Based on this, it is likely that a plaintiff will always be able to
satisfy the access requirement because virtually every musical work is
available through one, if not more, of the music streaming platforms
available to consumers today.
139 Number of Apple Music Subscribers Worldwide from October 2015 to June 2019 (in mil-
lions), STATISTA (July 2, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/604959/number-of-apple-music-
subscribers/.
140 Jon Porter, Spotify Is First To 100 Million Paid Subscribers, THE VERGE (Apr. 29, 2019,
7:39 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/29/18522297/spotify-100-million-users-apple-music-
podcasting-free-users-advertising-voice-speakers, (explaining that including free subscribers, Spotify
has a total of 217 million monthly active users worldwide).
141 Radio Facts and Figures, NEWS GENERATION (compiled from 2018 Nielsen Audio Today
and Pew State of the News Media 2017), https://www.newsgeneration.com/broadcast-resources/
radio-facts-and-figures/.
142 Malkin v. Dubinsky, 203 N.Y.S.2d 501, 508 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960) (“Accidental similarity
is not actionable plagiarism.”).
143 Id. (explaining that a “plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants had access thereto”
and that “copying may be shown by direct evidence of access, that the alleged plagiarist had seen or
heard the plaintiff’s work, or by proper circumstantial evidence . . . .”).
144 Repp v. Webber, 947 F. Supp. 105, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing to ABKCO Music, Inc. v.
Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 998 (2d Cir. 1983) and Repp v. Webber, 892 F. Supp 552,
556–57 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
145 Three Boys Music, 212 F.3d at 482 (explaining that “[t]here must be a reasonable possibil-
ity of viewing the plaintiff’s work—not a bare possibility.”).
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To have the opportunity to listen to music streaming platforms, con-
sumers must have access to certain devices such as radios, TVs,
smartphones, and computers. A recent study shows how a majority of the
United States population has access to devices compatible with music
streaming services: radio reaches 92% of the population; TV reaches
87%; 81% have access to a smartphone; 54% have access to a personal
computer; and 46% have access to a tablet.146 Additionally, an over-
whelming majority of the United States population listens to music, dedi-
cating more than 25 hours each week listening to music at home, while
driving, working, and doing chores.147 With numbers such as these, the
mere opportunity for a defendant to hear a particular work will always be
satisfied.
If the access requirement is always found to be satisfied because of
people’s access to devices and music streaming platforms like Spotify
and Apple, then it follows that access should be presumed in all music
copyright infringement cases.
C. WITH ACCESS PRESUMED, COURTS SHOULD ABANDON THE
INVERSE-RATIO RULE
1. History of The Inverse-Ratio Rule
The roots of the inverse-ratio rule date back to the late 1930s when a
plaintiff alleged that his stage play was infringed by a defendant’s mo-
tion picture.148 The court held that “where there is access, there is a high
degree of probability that the similarity results from copying and not
from independent thought and imagination. Indeed, it might well be said
that where access is proved or admitted, there is a presumption that the
similarity is not accidental.”149 Although the opinion declined to use the
words “inverse” or “ratio,” its reasoning is considered the fundamental
building blocks of the inverse-ratio rule.150 The phrase “inverse ratio
rule” was used for the first time in a 1954 copyright case.151
146 Audio Today 2019: How America Listens, THE NIELSEN COMPANY, at 3 (June 2019),
https://www.nielsen.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2019/06/audio-today-2019.pdf.
147 Everyone Listens to Music, But How We Listen Is Changing, THE NIELSEN COMPANY (Jan.
22, 2015), https://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/article/2015/everyone-listens-to-music-but-how-
we-listen-is-changing/, (explaining that 93% of the U.S. population listens to music, with 25% lis-
tening in their car, 15% listening at work, and 15% listening while doing chores).
148 See Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 100 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1938).
149 Id. at 538.
150 David Aronoff, Exploding the “Inverse Ratio Rule”, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 125,
130 (2008) (citing to Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 100 F.2d 533, 538 (2d Cir. 1938)).
151 Morse v. Fields, 127 F. Supp. 63, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
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i. Critisicms of The Inverse-Ratio Rule
The inverse-ratio rule has received criticism over the years as being
confusing and difficult to apply.152 For example, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the rule in Arc Music Corp. v.
Lee where the court examined the inverse-ratio rule and found that it
lacked any analytical value.153
The Ninth Circuit attempted to explain its version of the inverse-
ratio rule as requiring a lesser showing of substantial similarity if there is
a strong showing of access.154 This rule only works in one direction–that
is, “while a strong showing of access will result in a lower threshold
showing of substantial similarity, a weak showing of access does not
require a greater showing of similarities between the plaintiff’s and de-
fendant’s works.”155 However, when the inverse-ratio rule is applied,
courts remain unsure of how less the showing of substantial similarity
need be.156 No court has provided a standard for the “ratio” itself. As one
scholar stated, “If the [inverse-ratio rule] is genuinely a ratio, what quan-
tum of additional strong access excuses what measure of weak similar-
ity? Does 15% greater access excuse 15% less similarity?”157
ii. The Ninth Circuit Quietly Abolished the Inverse-Ratio Rule in the
Second Opinion
In the first opinion, the Ninth Circuit used the inverse-ratio rule in its
analysis of “Blurred Lines” and “Got To Give It Up.”158 Accordingly,
because Williams and Thicke admitted at trial that they had a high degree
of access to “Got To Give It Up,” the Gayes’ burden of proof for sub-
stantial similarity was lowered.159 The first opinion of Williams added
another case to the list of Ninth Circuit cases that failed to provide a clear
standard for the inverse-ratio rule. The only explanation the court gave in
the first opinion was that the Gayes’ burden of proof of substantial simi-
152 David Aronoff, Exploding the “Inverse Ratio Rule”, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 125,
143 (2008) (“The IRR is a deleterious doctrine that provides no analytical benefits in evaluating or
determining a copyright infringement case.”); see also William F. Patry, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT
§ 9:91 (2019) (“There is nothing positive that can be said about a rule that lacks any clarity at all:
trying to get a jury to both understand the rule and apply it properly is totally impossible.”).
153 Arc Music Corp. v. Lee, 296 F.2d 186, 187 (2d Cir. 1961).
154 Three Boys Music, 212 F.3d at 485.
155 Gable v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 727 F. Supp. 2d 815, 823 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 2010); see also Bernal
v. Paradigm Talent & Literary Agency, 788 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1053 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
156 Id. at 824 (recognizing that the inverse-ratio rule “is impossible to quantify”).
157 David Aronoff, Exploding the “Inverse Ratio Rule,” 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 125,
140 (2008).
158 Gaye, 885 F.3d at 1163, amended by 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018).
159 Id.
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larity was lowered because Williams and Thicke admitted to having a
high degree of access.160 The court did not quantify how the burden of
proof was to be lowered.
However, the omission of the inverse-ratio rule in the second opin-
ion can be construed as the Ninth Circuit quietly abolishing the inverse-
ratio rule. The inverse-ratio rule should be abandoned because a plaintiff
will always satisfy the access requirement with the technological ad-
vances discussed above. Lowering a plaintiff’s burden to prove substan-
tial similarity will not help the court determine whether a defendant
engaged in unlawful copying of the plaintiff’s musical work. Substantial
similarity is proven by “comparing the two works from the perspective
of the ordinary observer”161 and this comparison should be completely
unaffected by the defendant’s degree of access. Instead, the courts should
reiterate the importance of proving substantial similarity in music copy-
right infringement cases.
The omission of the inverse-ratio rule in the second opinion did not
affect the rest of the court’s analysis in the opinion.162 If proving access
was so crucial to the analysis, the Ninth Circuit would not have omitted
the inverse-ratio rule in the second opinion. This omission proves how
the Ninth Circuit is trying to adapt to the changing landscape in the copy-
right realm and why courts should abandon the inverse-ratio rule.
It should not follow that a plaintiff’s burden of proving substantial
similarity should be lowered because the public has access to the work as
well. There is the possibility that a defendant in a music copyright in-
fringement case has never heard the plaintiff’s work before. Lowering
the plaintiff’s burden of proving substantial similarity because of a high
showing of access does nothing to solve whether the works are truly
substantially similar. If the access requirement will always be satisfied
due to the amount of music available to consumers, then plaintiffs will
only need to show a “lesser” amount of similarity, which has the possi-
bility of leading to erroneous rulings and judgments against defendants.
The inverse-ratio rule should be abolished in courts because in the
modern day, a defendant’s access to a musical work will always be found
to exist. Under the current standard, access is easy to demonstrate be-
cause virtually every person has access to all public musical works. Since
the creation of YouTube, Spotify, Apple Music, and other similar plat-
forms, the access to music has never been greater.
160 Id.
161 William F. Patry, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:91 (2019).
162 Compare Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150 with, Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106.
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CONCLUSION
The Williams decision sent the music world into a flurry, with artists
fearing that the decision might severely limit their creativity and put a
stop to any music that has the same feel or groove as other music.163
Additionally, the first Williams opinion added another case to the list of
those that failed to provide a clear standard for the inverse-ratio rule. The
access requirement must be presumed in every music copyright infringe-
ment case to adapt to the changing landscape in the copyright realm.
Music streaming services revolutionized the music industry by changing
the way artists make music and the way people access music.164 Because
of platforms like Spotify and Apple Music, and based on the current
ways of proving access, a defendant will always be found to have access
to a plaintiff’s work. In addition to presuming access, and because access
should be presumed, the courts should abandon the inverse-ratio rule be-
cause music streaming platforms will always satisfy the access require-
ment in copyright infringement cases. Lowering the plaintiff’s burden of
proving substantial similarity because of a high showing of access does
nothing to solve whether the works are actually substantially similar.
163 Adrienne Gibbs, Marvin Gaye’s Family Wins ‘Blurred Lines’ Appeal; Pharrell, Robin
Thicke Must Pay, FORBES (Mar. 21, 2018, 3:37 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adriennegibbs/
2018/03/21/marvin-gaye-wins-blurred-lines-lawsuit-pharrell-robin-thicke-t-i-off-hook/#a8b7104689
b4; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Musicologists in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appel-
lees, 2016 WL 4592128, Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018) (over 200 songwriters,
composers, musicians, and producers warn the Ninth Circuit about the effect on the music industry if
infringement is found against the Thicke parties).
164 What Is Streaming Music and How Has it Changed the Industry?, MN2S (Apr. 23, 2018),
https://mn2s.com/news/label-services/what-is-streaming-music-changed-industry/.
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